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GOD'S BRIDLE:
JOHN CALVIN'S APPLICATION OF NATURAL LAW
C. Scott Pryor*
INTRODUCTION

Natural law has made a comeback in legal philosophy.' The
revival of natural law thinking in the legal academy began about thirty
years ago and has managed to gain a seat at the table in current
jurisprudential discussions. Defining natural law, Brian Bix declares
that it "claims that there are fundamental and evaluative connections
between the universe, human nature, and morality."2 These connections
need not have a Christian or even a theistic foundation. A belief in
moral realism, that is, the propositions that "(1) there is an objective
reality, (2) human beings can know something about it, and (3) there are
some things that everyone can, and some things that everyone ought to,
do in response to what they know,"3 ties together theistic and nontheistic versions of natural law. Yet many prominent contemporary
natural law theorists-J. Budziszewski, 4 John Finnis,5 Robert George,6
and Russell Hittinger 7-are Roman Catholic. Despite the fact that
* Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law. J.D. 1980, University of Wisconsin
Law School; M.A. 1997, Reformed Theological Seminary. I wish to thank Allen Smith for his
editorial assistance and Glenn Hoshauer for his research assistance and suggestion for the title.
Byron Curtis and David VanDrunen provided valuable comments and suggestions on the
substance of this piece. I also wish to thank Michael Schutt and the Institute for Christian Legal
Studies for providing the opportunity for my initial presentation of the material which has become
this article.
1. See J. Stanley McQuade & Richard T. Bowser, Marketing Natural Law: An OverDebated and Undersold Product, 27 Campbell L. Rev. 187, 188 (2005) [hereinafter McQuade &
Bower, Marketing Natural Law] ("There has been a considerable resurgence of interest in Natural
Law theory among lawyers in general .... ").
2. Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 75
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1613, 1614 (2000).
3. Thomas C. Folsom, The Restatement of the Obvious: Or, What's Right Got To Do With
It? Reflections on a Business Ethicfor Our Times, 16 Regent U. L. Rev. 301, 315 (2004).
4. J. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law (InterVaristy Press
1997) [hereinafter Budziszewski, Written on the Heart].
5. John Finnis, NaturalLaw and NaturalRights (Oxford U. Press 1980).
6. Robert P. George, In Defense of NaturalLaw (Oxford U. Press 1999).
7. Russell Hittinger, The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian
World (ISI Books 2003) [hereinafter Hittinger, The First Grace].
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Finnis and George develop their natural law arguments without
reference to any metaphysical states of affairs or transcendent truth
claims, natural law continues to be associated with Thomas Aquinas and
the subsequent scholastic tradition. Thus, even standards that Finnis and
George derive from the internal rationality of law strike some as
disguised theology.8
Relatively few legal scholars have adopted an explicit natural law
approach. It seems that most legal academics find unattractive an
approach that asserts that moral truths can be derived from the nature of
the universe or abstract "human nature." 9 And evaluation of legal
standards in terms of a putative divine order is certainly out of bounds.'"
Lack of enthusiasm from those committed to a full-blown, narrowly
understood positivism is not surprising. After all, if moral realism is
rejected out of hand and law is presumed to be only convention, there is
little room for natural law, whether transcendent or imminent. Inclusive
positivists like H.L.A. Hart admit that natural law exists, but only
because some participants in the legal system believe in natural law, and
any descriptive theory of law must take the participants' views into
account."1
Nonetheless, even Hart's evaluation of law remains
descriptive; there is no source of evaluation of the law outside of the
participants themselves. Questions of law's normativity, that is, how the
law measures up against a meta-legal standard, are outside the scope of
the positivist's project. Consequentialists who evaluate positive law
from the standpoint of its efficiency are natural law thinkers of a sort but
are rarely identified as such.
Perhaps the difference between
immanentistic natural law theorists like Finnis and consequentialists like
Richard Posner is that the former evaluate "natural" from the ends or
goals of human life in general and the latter from the purportedly
empirical standard of the individual human being as a wealthmaximizing animal.' 2
8. See e.g. Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of
"Public Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of Equal
Protection Review?, 87 Geo. L.J. 139, 157, 162, 164 (1998) (classifying the natural law
jurisprudence of John Finnis as "theology" and "essentially the same [ ] as that made by the
Roman Catholic Church").
9. See e.g. Alf Ross, Validity and Conflict Between Legal Positivism and Natural Law, in
Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes 147 (Stanley L. Paulson &
Bonnie Paules eds., Oxford U. Press 1998).
10. See Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief How American Law and Politics
Trivialize Religious Devotion 9 (BasicBooks 1993) ("[O]ur public culture more and more prefers
religion as something without political significance, less an independent moral force than a quietly
irrelevant moralizer, never heard, rarely seen.").
11. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 1994).
12. See e.g. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 3-4 (5th ed., Aspen L. & Bus.
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The positivist's reluctance to measure the law against any external
standard and the consequentialist's reduction of that standard to
efficiency are not universally shared by advocates or courts. Almost
everyone wants to evaluate the law from some more fundamental
perspective or a prior premise. 3
The currently unresolved and
frequently unarticulated question is by what prior premises the law
should be judged. 4
The failure of most explicitly Protestant legal academics to follow
the natural law trails articulated by Catholic thinkers or to develop a
distinctively Protestant approach is puzzling."5 Assuming that their
Protestant theological convictions are deeply held, there might be
several reasons why this is the case. One might be satisfaction with one
of natural law's competing philosophies, particularly consequentialism.
Consequentialism in the form of law and economics appeals to many,
including those who believe that values apart from wealth maximization
are important.1 6 After all, focusing on the efficiency of legal rules works
well to explain and critique legal rules in many fields of private law. 7
Another reason why this may be the case is the negative or at least
skeptical attitude of some leading Protestant theologians and their
epigones toward natural law.' 8 Catholic legal thinkers can appropriate
1998) ("The task of economics ... is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational
maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions-what we shall call his 'self-interest."'); Richard A.
Posner, Legal Reasoningfrom the Top Down and the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated
ConstitutionalRights, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 433 (1992) (rejecting policy ("top down") arguments in
constitutional interpretation because they are indeterminate).
13. See e.g. Hittinger, The First Grace, supra n. 7, at xvi ("Yves Simon has usefully proposed
that the theories and ideologies of natural law seek to discover or assert the 'prior premises' of
human law.").
14. A number of sets of such premises have been deployed in the Western world. Citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Hittinger
describes the currently reigning paradigm-maximal individual autonomy: "the Casey Court folds
the positive law into the principle of a natural right. The absence of legislative power [e.g., to
regulate abortion] is established by the right of the individual to be self-norming." Hittinger, The
First Grace, supra n. 7, at xxxii (emphasis added). Yet, individual autonomy is not and certainly
has not been the only premise of legal evaluation. Natural law in one form or another has a far
longer pedigree in the West as the source of law's prior premises.
15. Harold Berman is one of the few exceptions to the general rule that Protestant legal
academics fail to make significant use of the concept of natural law. See e.g. Harold J. Berman,
Law and Revolution, I: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal
Tradition (Harv. U. Press 2003).
16. See e.g. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in Christian
Perspectives On Legal Thought 208, 212 (Yale U. Press 2001) ("To be clear, I am not arguing that
a godly society promotes wealth maximization at all costs.").
17. Id. at 223 ("[A] Christian legal scholar may rely on both positive and normative economic
analysis with confidence that it is both a powerful analytic tool and one that is consistent with his
or her walk with God.").
18. See e.g. Karl Barth, No!, in Natural Theology 65 (Peter Fraenkel trans., The Centenary
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the analytical tools of a long tradition of sophisticated theological
analysis of natural law, with or without attribution. In contrast, some
Protestant theologians, particularly twentieth-century thinkers in the
Reformed tradition, have eschewed the concept of natural law. 19 For
whatever reasons, Protestant legal scholars have tended to remain apart
from any revival of natural law thinking. z
In light of the reluctance of the wider Christian community to work
from the natural law tradition, several writers have attempted to recast
natural law in way that would have broader appeal across the range of
Christian traditions. J. Budziszewski, then an Episcopalian, wrote
Written On the Heart in 1997 in which he surveys the natural law
tradition with special attention to the views of those outside the Catholic
tradition. 21 The Catholic Russell Hittinger wrote The First Grace in
2003 and, while he works from within a distinctively Catholic
perspective on natural law, Hittinger took pains to relate natural law to
Despite the efforts of
the distinctives of Protestant thought.2 2
Budziszewski and Hittinger, questions remain whether there is a
fundamental division between natural law and Protestant theological
sensibilities. Is natural law a concept like the Trinitarian nature of God
that Catholics and Protestants share, or is it like the doctrine of

Press 1946) [hereinafter Barth, No!]; August Lang, The Reformation and Natural Law, in Calvin
and the Reformation: Four Studies 56 (William Park Armstrong ed., Fleming H. Revell Co.
1909).
19. See e.g. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV.I 140 (T & T Clark 1932):
Sin is man's denial of himself in the face of the grace of His Creator. It is not directed
against a so-called law of nature. There is no law of nature which is both recognizable as
such and yet also has divine character and authority. There is no law and commandment
of God inherent in the creatureliness of man as such, or written and revealed in the stars
as a law of the cosmos ....
See also Jacques Ellul, The Theological Foundation of Law 8 (Seabury Press 1960) ("[T]he
incredible difficulties this new natural law must face ... are, in my opinion, insurmountable.").
Other Protestant theologians have largely ignored the topic of natural law. See e.g. Charles
Hodge, Systematic Theology (Scribner's 1871); Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (W.B.
Eerdmans Pub 1938); Thomas C. Oden, Systematic Theology (Harper & Row 1989); Wayne
Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Zondervan Publg. House
1994).
20. Samuel W. Calhoun, GroundingNormative Assertions: Arthur Leffis Still Irrefutable, But
Incomplete, "Sez Who?" Critique, 20 J.L. & Religion 31 (2004-05); William J. Stuntz, Book
Review: Christian Legal Theory, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (2003) (reviewing Christian
Perspectives on Legal Thought).
21. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart, supra n. 4, at 95-133 (John Locke), 207-212 (John
Calvin & Martin Luther).
22. See e.g. Hittinger, The FirstGrace, supra n. 7, at xli-xliii (connecting Pope John Paul It's
teaching about "participated theonomy" in his 1993 encyclical Veritatis Splendor with the Dutch
Reformed doctrine of "sphere sovereignty" articulated by Abraham Kuyper in his Lectures on
Calvinism delivered at Princeton in 1898).
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justification by faith alone which continues to divide them?2 3 And even
if Catholics and Protestants can share the concept of natural law, can
they consistently deploy it while being in harmony with their respective
traditions?
Answers to both questions can be found in the writings of the
theological grandfather of Reformed theology, John Calvin.2 4 Calvin's
magnum opus, the Institutes of the Christian Religion,25 contains a
number of positive references to natural law, the law of nature, or the
like.26 In his commentaries, Calvin makes even more use of natural
law.27 In addition to these express statements, Calvin presupposed the
validity of natural law in his discussion of the state. However, even
assuming that Calvin's imprimatur of natural law carries some weight
with Protestant legal scholars,28 the question of whether Calvin's use of
23. Despite the substantial efforts by the Worldwide Lutheran Federation and the Roman
Catholic Church culminating in The Joint Declarationon the Doctrineof Justificationin 1999, the
competing understandings ofjustification have not been resolved. See Ted M. Dorman, The Joint
Declarationon the Doctrine of Justification: Retrospect and Prospects, 44 J. Evangelical Theol.
Socy. 421 (2001).
24. The choice of John Calvin (1509-64) as opposed to, say, Martin Luther, is not arbitrary.
The theological and cultural influence of Calvin far exceeded that of any other reformer. See e.g.
Philip Benedict, Christ's Churches Purely Reformed: A Social History of Calvinism xv (Yale U.
Press 2002) ("Although Martin Luther towered over the initial decades of the Reformation,
Calvinism superseded Lutheranism within a generation as the most dynamic and widely
established form of European Protestantism.").
25. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (John T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles
trans., Westminster Press 1960) (1559) [hereinafter Calvin, Institutes].
26. See e.g. Calvin, Institutes supra n. 25, at I.xvi.3 ("law of nature"), II.ii.22, II.viii.l,
IV.xx. 16 ("natural law"). See also Susan E. Schreiner, The Theater of His Glory: Nature and
Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin 77 (Labyrinth Press 1991) [hereinafter Schreiner,
Theater of His Glory]:
In comparison with the medieval tradition, Calvin's discussions of natural law seem
imprecise and unsystematic .... Nonetheless, he took over the traditional terminology
and referred (sometimes interchangeably) to the "ius aequum," "lex naturae," "lex
naturalis," and "ius gentium."... Often Calvin referred simply to "common sense," the
"dictates of nature," or simply "nature.".. . [T]hroughout his writings, Calvin
emphasized the efficacy of such natural insight. Two of Calvin's most extensive
statements regarding natural law are his comments on Romans 2:14-15 and the Institutes
11.8.1 ....
27. See infra text accompanying nn. 126 & 140. See also I. John Hesselink, Calvin's
Concept of the Law 52 (Pickwick Publications 1992) [hereinafter Hesselink, Calvin's Concept of
Law] (citing references to natural law in Calvin's commentaries); Arthur C. Cochrane, Natural
Law in Calvin, in Church-State Relations in Ecumenical Perspective 176, 181 (Elwyn A. Smith
ed., Duquesne U. Press 1966) [hereinafter Cochrane, Church-State Relations]
Calvin's writings, especially his commentaries on the Pentateuch and his sermons on the
Book of Deuteronomy and the Book of Job, are so full
of references to ius naturae,lex
naturae, ordo naturae, sensus naturae, communis sensus, to conscience, reason and
experience, that the subject [of natural law] cannot be brusquely dismissed.
28. Drawing on Calvin's works, I have concluded that he had a positive view of natural law.
See infra text accompanying nn. 124-142. This conclusion has been contested. See e.g. Karl
Barth, No!, supra n. 18. In addition to Calvin himself, my position finds support among a number
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the term natural law in the sixteenth century is consistent with the
articulations of either Budziszewski or Hittinger today must be
answered.2 9 To set the stage for this analysis, I will compare the natural
law analyses of Budziszewski and Hittinger. Then I will consider the
place, foundations, and utility of the natural law in Calvin's thought. I
will conclude by discussing whether the common moral realism of
Budziszewski and Hittinger and those who agree with Calvin is a
sufficient platform for joint Catholic and Protestant natural law
reasoning.
BUDZISZEWSKI AND HITTINGER: DIFFERING EMPHASES WITHIN A
COMMON TRADITION

We will begin with Hittinger because, standing within the Roman
Catholic Church, we initially suppose his discussion of natural law as
more problematic from a Protestant perspective. Hittinger sets as his
initial task the reintegration of natural law into moral theology,
admitting that "the idea of natural law in the Catholic tradition has only
recently, and as an aberration, been developed as a concept completely
detached from theology., 30 How, one might ask, could anything in the
Catholic tradition, particularly something as historically significant as
natural law, become "detached from theology?" Over the course of his
first chapter, Hittinger argues that over the past fifty years, Catholic
moral theologians have succumbed to the reconfiguration of natural law
in various Enlightenment state of nature scenarios.
Rather than
continuing to understand natural law to be founded in God's providence,
many contemporary Catholics now take natural law as an autonomous
imposition by humanity on the order of their social existence:
[t]he natural law becomes "temporal," the temporal becomes
"secular," and the secular becomes the sphere in which human
agents enjoy immunity from any laws other than those they impose
of well-regarded contemporary scholars. See e.g. Richard A. Muller, The UnaccomodatedCalvin:
Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition (Oxford U. Press 2000); Susan E. Schreiner,
Calvin's Use ofNatural Law, in A PreservingGrace: Protestants, Catholics,and NaturalLaw 51
(Michael Cromartie ed., W.B. Eerdmans Pubig. Co. 1997).
29. As Alessandro d'Entr~ves noted:
There can be no greater delusion than to believe that the history of these notions [of
natural law] may be written by simply drawing up a list, as careful and complete as
possible, of all the references to them which can be found in political writers. The
formal continuity of certain expression is not the decisive factor: the same notion may
have had very different meanings and have served entirely different purposes.
A.P. d'Entr~ves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy 9-10 (Hutchinson's U. Lib.
1951) [hereinafter d'Entr6ves, NaturalLaw].
30. Hittinger, The First Grace, supra n. 7, at 3.
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upon themselves. 3'
Natural law is32no longer "law" but a source of "immunities against the
order of law.",
Hittinger addresses himself to the restoration of the providential
foundation of natural law by distilling it into three orders: "order in
nature, order in the human mind, and order in the divine mind., 33 While
this set of prior premises of natural law can be viewed through the lens
of each individual perspective, Hittinger's fundamental perspective on
natural law is as order in the divine mind, i.e., as an "ordinance of a
divine lawgiver., 34 Natural law is grounded in the mind of God and
only subsequently impressed on created reality and the human mind.
Natural law was not only part of the original creation order, it "continues
as an expression of divine providence."3' 5 Following Pope John Paul II,
Hittinger downplays the traditional locus classicus of natural law,
Romans 2:14-15, in order to emphasize the divine origin of natural law
over its human reception.3 6 Appearing with the creation, and thus before
God's work of redemption, natural law qualifies as "the first grace."37
Hittinger largely avoids discussion of potentially contentious topics such
as the telos or goal of human life, the list of natural and supernatural
virtues, the nature of being in general, how the human intellect
participates in the divine, and the teaching authority of the Catholic
magisterium.
While hewing closely to classical Thomistic reasoning and
conclusions, Hittinger presents them in a way to allay Protestant
concerns that to accept the possibility of natural law moral reasoning
would be disloyal to their own traditions.3 8 In short, Hittinger works to
31. Id. at 14-15. We will see that grounded natural law in providence will be an important
point of contact between the understandings of Hittinger and Calvin. See infra text accompanying
nn. 104-123.
32. Hittinger, The First Grace, supra n. 7, at14.
33. Id. at xvi.
34. Id. at 4 (noting that natural law can be described from the perspectives of order in nature
(natural law as the external-empirical) and order in the human mind (natural law as the internalsubjective)). See infra n. 90 for Calvin's agreement with the priority of order in the divine mind.
35. Hittinger, The First Grace, supra n. 7, at 5.
36. Id. at 40:
The encyclical [Veritatis Splendor] gives only passing attention to the well-known proof
text in Romans 2:14 ("The gentiles who had not the law, did naturally things of the
law"); but repeated reference is made to the second chapter of Genesis .... Rather than
making the issue of natural law rest principally on what people know (or do)
independent of the divine positive law, the passage in Genesis raises the more basic
theological issue of how to characterize divine governance prior to Torah ....
37. The title of Hittinger's book is taken from the so-called Second Council of Aries (c. 473)
in which natural law is for the first time so described. Id. at xi.
38. While Hittinger castigates Protestants who too quickly deny the efficacy of natural law
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reconnect natural law to orthodox Christian theology of creation and
providence.3 9 Hittinger defends and applies the use of natural law in
connection with several contentious issues including the relationship of
natural law to adjudication and legislation, assisted suicide, and the
place of religion in the public square.
Budziszewski is not a lawyer and Written on the Heart is written
for a popular audience. Given his Protestant orientation it is not
surprising that Budziszewski gives significant attention to an exegetical
foundation for natural law.4 ° In contrast to Hittinger, Budziszewski first
emphasizes the cognitive aspect of natural law: How can those who have
never heard the Christian account of creation or the moral law explicated
in Scripture know it? His answer relies on the Christian understanding
of general revelation.4 1 And of the various forms of general revelation,4 2
Budziszewski chooses to focus on the human conscience, the law
"written on the heart. 4 3
Budziszewski revealed his Protestant
sensibilities by next noting the epistemic effects of sin and downplaying
the utility of this internally inscribed law:
Rather than accepting God as our god, we want to be gods to
ourselves (Genesis 3:1-6). To do this we "hold down".., the
truth-we pretend to ourselves that we do not know what we really
do know .... Persistence in such pretense darkens or perverts

due to an overemphasis on an "epistemology of sin," he agrees that the overemphasis on the
orders of nature and the human mind by secularists and some contemporary Catholic writers is
"contrary to the gospel." Id. at 33-34.
39. Hittinger devotes a full chapter to grounding natural law as the ordinance of a divine
lawgiver, not the autonomous imposition of the human mind on a uninterpreted natural order. Id.
at 39-62.
40. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart,supra n. 4, at 179-186 (concluding with the remark
that "[o]ur analysis must be anchored in God's Word."). Subsequent to writing Written on the
Heart, Budziszewski was received into the Roman Catholic Church. See Ignatius Insight,
Objections, Obstacles, Acceptance: Interview with J. Budziszewski, http://www.ignatiusinsight.
com/features2005/jbudziszewski-intl-feb05.asp (Feb. 2005) (originally printed in 14 Cath. World
Rpt. 50 (Jan. 2005)).
41. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart,supra n. 4, at 180 ("In contrast to special revelation,
provided by God to the community of faith, this may be called general revelation because it is
provided by God to all mankind.") (emphasis in original).
42. Budziszewski acknowledges five forms of general revelation: "(1) the testimony of
creation ... ; (2) the fact that we are made in the image of God ... ; (3) the facts of our physical
and emotional design... ; (4) the law of conscience ... ; (5) the order of causality." Id. at 180181.
43. Id. at 181. Budziszewski's emphasis on the conscience corresponds most closely to
Hittinger's category of order in the human mind. Budziszewski also identifies categories of
natural revelation that correspond to the category of order in nature. While he doesn't identify a
category like order in the divine mind, there can be little doubt that Budziszewski believes such to
be the case.
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44
such natural knowledge as God has given US.
Budziszewski goes on to assert that acknowledgment of the natural
law is an act of faith.45 Human beings can't not know the natural law
but they can suppress it and refuse to acknowledge its existence.
Of what use is natural law for Budziszewski? How can appeals to
natural law function when many suppress their knowledge of it?
Budziszewski replies that "[tihe main use of general revelation,
including the natural law, is apologetics: giving a reason for the hope
that lies within us." '46 Giving a reason to whom? Certainly those who
suppress their knowledge of natural law, which Budziszewski clarifies
by noting that among the purposes of apologetics is its moral use: "to
leaven the civil law we share with our nonbelieving neighbors." 7
Budziszewski believes that the commonly known but regularly
unacknowledged law written on the heart provides a point of contact
regardless of the mixed faith commitments in a modem secular polity.
Natural law in the political realm is thus primarily a tool for crafting a
civil order in which those who know God's revealed will can express it
in ways that can gain a hearing in the public square.4 8

CALVIN AND NATURAL LAW

Hittinger and Budziszewski provide modem Protestant legal
thinkers with differing perspectives on natural law. In turn, their
perspectives raise several questions about natural law. Where is the
foundation of natural law? Is it first in the divine order or in the orders
of creation, whether nature or the human mind? And how should we
understand the effects of sin on the order of the mind be understood? Is
natural law, regardless of the order on which it is grounded, an
independent basis on which to frame a civil polity or is it a tool by
which the specially revealed order can be made more understandable to
a post-Christian world?

44.
45.

Id. at 182.
Id. at 183 ("[I]t is a far cry from knowing something to acknowledging it, and the human

race has been in the condition psychologists call 'denial' ever since the Fall.
what we really know is now an act of faith.").
46.

Acknowledging

Id. at 184.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 183-184:
There is a natural law, and it can be known and philosophically analyzed. But that
which is beside the Scripture can be vindicated only with the help of Scripture; that
which is revealed before the gospel can be secured against evasion only in the light of
the gospel. The doctrine of natural law is best grounded not in the study of nature
independent of God's Word but in the Word of God itself
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John Calvin may seem to be an inappropriate resource for
considering the answers to these questions. Because Calvin wrote in a
premodern time before the turn to epistemology in philosophy and in an
age when the verities of the Christian religion were nearly universally
accepted, one could easily conclude that Calvin's work would provide
little light on currently contested issues. But a canvass of his writings
will prove useful, particularly to Protestants who see little value in
natural law. Before addressing Calvin's positions on the source and
utility of natural law I will briefly situate him in the history of natural
law thinking.
A.

Calvin's Place in the Natural Law Tradition

Calvin's use of natural law did not represent a radical shift from the
recent past.4 9 While differing in some respects from the natural law
analysis of Thomas Aquinas, the origins of Calvin's views are in many
respects consistent with the theological developments of two hundred
years earlier.50 However, Calvin's view of several matters differed
substantially from subsequent post-Thomistic writers. The late medieval
trends toward nominalism and voluntarism did not figure into Calvin's
theological analysis. Instead, we can observe connections with parallel
Renaissance intellectual trends as well as consistency with Thomistic
natural law thinking.
John Calvin was born in 1509,"' nearly three hundred years after
Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), whose Summa Theologica represented the
culmination of scholastic theological expression. 2 Thomas's works
were characterized by the logical organization of Biblical doctrine,
drawn largely from Augustine as mediated through Peter Lombard, in
Aquinas believed that the
terms of Aristotelian principles.5 3
49. See Paul Helm, John Calvin's Ideas 2 (Oxford U. Press 2004) [hereinafter Helm, Calvin's
Ideas] ("[R]esearch into the medieval tradition, particularly into the world of late medieval
Augustinianism,... shows it to be much more multiform than previously thought and to contain
strands congenial to the incipient Reform movement ...").
50. See generally id. at 1-2 (repudiating Calvin as the rejecter of Catholic medieval
traditions).
5 1. See Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity: Reformation to the Present vol.
2, 751 (Hendrickson Publishers 1999) (originally published 1953).
52. See d'Entr~ves, Natural Law, supra n. 29, at 39 ("Although Thomist philosophy was at
first bitterly opposed by contemporary schools of thought, it finally won the battle. It has
remained ever since the most authoritative expression of what may well be called the Catholic
view of life.").
53. See I.C. Brady, Scholasticism, in 12 New Catholic Encyclopedia 757, 761 (Bernard L.
Marthaler et al. eds., Thomson/Gale 2003) ("For Thomas Aquinas, the basic problem was to
discover how as a Christian scholar he could order anew the whole structure of Christian wisdom
in such a way that pagan [Aristotelian] philosophy would be made tributary to the Christian
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deliverances of reason and divine revelation were consistent. 54 But at
least two characteristics of Aquinas's thought would later stand in
tension with Calvin's positions. 55 First, Thomas stated that the
relationship between the human and the divine was one of participation.
6
Nothing in Calvin's writings suggested that he shared Thomas's belief
in a metaphysical continuity or chain of being from God through man to
all of creation. Second, Thomas specified human participation in the
divine in terms of the faculty of reason.5 7 Participation in reason
provided the epistemic counterpart to metaphysical participation in
being and Calvin made no more use of the former than the latter.
Following Renaissance trends, Calvin rejected the Aristotelian
philosophy which underlay both metaphysical and epistemic
participation in favor of a simpler Biblical form of analysis that avoided
most philosophical speculation.58 Notwithstanding differences in their
modes of analysis, Calvin and Thomas reached substantially similar
conclusions with respect to the dependence of natural law on God.5 9

faith.").
54. See Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa Contra Gentiles 1.7
(Anton C. Pegis trans., Image Books 1955) (1259-64):
The natural dictates of reason must certainly be quite true: it is impossible to think of
their being otherwise. Nor again is it permissible to believe that the tenets of faith are
false, being so evidently confirmed by God. Since therefore falsehood alone is contrary
to truth, it is impossible for the truth of faith to be contrary to principles known by
natural reason.
See also William C. Placher, A History of Christian Theology: An Introduction 153 (The
Westminster Press 1983) [hereinafter Placher, A History of Christian Theology] ("If Thomas
distinguished between truths known through reason and those known through revelation, he did
not think that reason and revelation can ever contradict each other, since both come from God....
Revelation... does not contradict revelation but adds to it.").
55. See generally R.S. Clark, Calvin on the Lex Naturalis, 1998 Stulos Theol. J. 1, 3-4.
56. See e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia.3.5, Ia.5. 1, Ia.5.2 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1948) (1273) [hereinafter Aquinas, S. 1].
57. Id. at la.91.1-2. See also J.A. Weisheipl, Thomism, in 14 New Catholic Encyclopedia 40,
42 (Bernard L. Marthaler et al. eds., 2d ed., Thomson/Gale 2003) ("The unique substantial form of
man is his rational soul .. "); Heiko Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel
and Late Medieval Nominalism 90 (W.B. Eerdmans Pubg. Co. 1967) [hereinafter Oberman,
Medieval Harvest]:
In view of-the "intellectualism" of Thomas Aquinas, it is not surprising that for him
God's will is only a partner in the operation of the intellect in establishing the hierarchy
of eternal law, natural law and positive law. In his eyes it would be blasphemous to
assert that justice would ultimately depend on the will of God, as this would imply that
his will would not operate according to the order of wisdom.
58. See infra text accompanying n. 84.
59. See Allen Verhey, Natural Law in Aquinas and Calvin, in God and the Good 80, 84
(Clifton Orlebeke & Lewis Smedes eds., W.B. Eerdmans 1975) ("Both Thomas and Calvin see the
natural law as dependent on a reality of meaning and value built into the world by God's
purposeful creating and sustaining power.... [F]or both the wisdom of God establishes the
purposes of God. They are not merely a matter of arbitrary will.").
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In the century after Aquinas's death, the tide of medieval
philosophy turned toward nominalism, terminism, and voluntarism.
With William of Ockham (c. 1278-1347), nominalism broke the
connection of intellectual participation between human beings and God.
Thomas's epistemology had presumed that human knowing was
grounded in rational participation in the divine "real" idea. 60 Thus,
Thomistic realism maintained that human ideas ultimately derived from
matters in heaven. Everything earthly was analogous to a divine idea.
Nominalism denied realism and limited itself to the perspectives that
Hittinger describes as order in the human mind. Logic, the tool of
reason, was no longer the means of identifying the analogy between the
objects of perception and the mind of God. Instead, logic was primarily
concerned with relationships between the language or terms of
perception and the human mind (thus, terminism). 61 Epistemic realism
was weakened and with it weakened the concept of participation as the
justification for truth claims. Of course, truth claims could still be made;
but they were reduced to the content of the faith (revelation) and what
Kant would later call analytic statements. The retreat of realistic
metaphysics and participation epistemology also led to the waning of
Without reason as the point of contact
medieval intellectualism.
between God and humanity, Ockham and his followers turned to the will
of God as the only basis for truth (thus, voluntarism). Voluntarism
emphasized the independence of God's will from any cause, including
his being, nature, or knowledge. The nominalists did not deny that there
was a natural law; however, the natural law bound as law only because
God's will imposed it on a created humanity.62 The intrinsic correlation
of the orders of the divine mind, nature, and the human mind was
severed.
Nominalism (the via moderna)63 would have composed a
substantial part of Calvin's philosophical education while he was a
60. See Aquinas, S.T., supra n. 56, 2a.9 1.1 (citing Proverbs 8:23 for the etemality of divine
law).
61. See T.H.L. Parker, John Calvin: A Biography 11 (Westminster Press 1975) [hereinafter
Parker, Biography] ("Terminist logic was... concerned with the analysis of language, or rather,
with the analysis of the relationship between language about objects, the mental conception of the
object, and the object itself.").
62. See John Kilcullen, Natural Law and Will in Ockham, in A Translation of William of
Ockham's Work of Ninety Days vol. 2, 851 (John Kilcullen & John Scott trans., Edwin Mellen
Press 2001).
63. See David VanDrunen, The Context of Natural Law: John Calvin's Doctrine of the Two
Kingdoms, 46 J. Church & St. 503, 506, 508-509 (2004) [hereinafter VanDrunen, Context of
Natural Law] ("The traditional division of late medieval theology into two distinct and competing
schools, the realist, intellectualist via antiqua and the nominalist, voluntarist via moderna is
familiar to scholars of this period.").

225]

GOD'S BRIDLE

student at Paris.64 Yet we must be careful to distinguish Calvin's
ultimate theological positions from nominalism and voluntarism in
general and terminism in particular. Terminist logic games are absent
from the Institutes.6 5
Instead, the Institutes begin with Calvin's
confident declaration that "[n]early all the wisdom we possess, that is to
say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts: the knowledge of
God and of ourselves. 6 6 As T.H.L. Parker notes:
a complete intellectual reversal [was] necessary before [Calvin]
could confidently and joyfully understand that knowledge was
relationship between subject and object ... and that the intellect,
far from moulding the object, is itself formed
67 to the capacity of the
knowledge of the object by the object itself.
Calvin certainly emphasized the importance of the will of God. He
wrote in connection with the doctrine of election that "[God's] will is,
and rightly ought to be, the cause of all things that are. For if it has any
cause, something must precede it [and] this is unlawful to imagine. 6 8
Moreover, the typical Thomistic language of human participation in the
divine reason is absent in his writings. Yet Calvin should not be
counted a voluntarist. He heartily rejected the Ockhamist distinction
between God's potentia absoluta (absolute power) and potentia ordinata
(ordained power).6 9
The distinction between God's absolute and ordained powers can
be traced to the early years of scholasticism. Thomas introduced his
discussion of this distinction in connection with his Question 25-"The
Power of God." Restating Thomas we ask: if God is omnipotent,7 ° then
can he do what he has not in fact done? 71 Or, more to the point, can God
64. See Alister E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture
21-50 (Basil Blackwell 1990) [hereinafter McGrath, Life]; Parker, Biography, supra n. 61, at 1012.
65. Calvin was certainly not illogical; he freely used the Aristotelian categories of "cause"
where helpful. See e.g. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at lII.xiv.21; John Calvin, Commentary on
the Epistles of Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians201
(Ages
Software
1998)
(1548)
(commenting on Ephesians 1:5).
66. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at Ii. 1. See Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr., Faith and Reason
from Plato to Plantinga. An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology 143-174 (SUNY Press 1991)
[hereinafter Hoitenga, Faith and Reason] (providing an extended account of Calvin's robust
theory of knowledge).
67. Parker, Biography,supra n. 61, at 12.
68. Calvin, Institutes,supra n. 25, at III.xxiii.2.
69. See Helm, Calvin's Ideas, supra n. 49, at 117 ("Calvin repeatedly denies that his view of
providence requires that God be understood, in accordance with that 'Sarbonic dogma', as pure
will ... ; rather, in God will and wisdom are inseparably united in one simple essence.").
70. Aquinas, S. T, supra n. 56, at Ia.25.3 ("All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence consists ... .
71. Aquinas, S.T, supra n. 56, at la.25.5.
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change his will with respect to the law? If the answer were yes, then
order in the divine mind would be too unpredictable to ground a natural
law. Law for the believer would at best be justified upon divine positive
law. The orders of the human mind and nature would remain but, as
Hittinger has demonstrated, such purely terrestrial orders have not
proved up to the task of supplying a non-arbitrary prior premise to
evaluate positive law."
Thomas ultimately rejected the division
between the two powers on ontological grounds. God is certainly free to
do other than He has chosen but God's freedom should not be
understood apart from His nature. The range of what God can
conceivably do is not ab extra: "[w]hatever can have the nature of being
falls within the range of things that are absolutely possible, and it is with
respect to these that God is called omnipotent."73 Consistency with
God's being-not simply logical consistency-is the range of God's
power. Thus variation in the natural law (reflecting order in the divine
mind) is greatly limited. God cannot will today that murder is wrong
and decree the opposite tomorrow.
The tight connection between the two potentiae dissolved
following Thomas and the distinction between them became more
important in dogmatic theology with nominalists.74 For the nominalists,
God's power was not limited by the unity of his nature. God could do
whatever was consistent with the laws of logic. While God could not
simultaneously decree that murder and preservation of life were moral
goods, there would be no reason why he could not do so sequentially.7 5
On the other hand, Church doctrine and scriptural revelation clearly
rejected such an inordinate divine freedom. The nominalists were able
to keep within the pale of orthodoxy by emphasizing another doctrine
clearly taught in Scripture-covenant.
To understand how the covenant idea functioned in nominalism,
the dialectic between God's potentia absoluta-His absolute power-

72. Hittinger, The First Grace, supra n. 7, at xxiii ("Thomas differs from modern
philosophers who speak of inclination as mere physical appetition that provides the material for
instrumental reason-reason as the slave of the passions.").
73. Aquinas, S.T, supra n. 56, at Ia.25.3.
74. See Oberman, Medieval Harvest,supra n. 57, at 36.
75. As Oberman notes:
For both Biel and Thomas natural law known by the dictate of right reason is dependable
and immutable. The difference appears that in the sovereign God has, according to Biel,
the freedom to dispense momentarily and in particular cases with some of the
commandments derived through direct revelation. This is impossible for Aquinas since
all the commandments of the Decalogue are, as norms in the strictest sense of the word,
a direct extension of the natural law and share therefore in its indispensability.
Oberman, Medieval Harvest, supra n. 57, at 110.
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and His potentia ordinata-Hisordained power-must be kept clearly
in mind. The first represents God's absolute power and sovereignty to
do whatsoever He desires free from all limitations except the law of noncontradiction. The second is God's ordained power which is the way
God has freely chosen to work. Here, God is bound by laws He has
imposed upon Himself. Since they are self-imposed, they are still a
result of God's potentia absoluta. In this way, the nominalistic
theologians were able to claim to hold to divine sovereignty and
freedom, yet also advocate the synergistic facientibus principle [human
merit] that obligates God to save the ones who do their best.76
Many scholars have claimed that Calvin was greatly indebted to
nominalism.7 7 Yet each of them has acknowledged that Calvin rejected
the sort of divine freedom exposed in nominalistic voluntarism.
However, they have failed to demonstrate the continuity of Thomas and
Calvin at this point. Like the nominalists, covenant was certainly
important to Calvin's thought.78
And God's covenant entailed
voluntarily undertaken obligations on his part.7 9
Yet Calvin
emphatically rejected the voluntaristic distinction between the two
potentiae of God in favor of the unity of his nature, thus following
Thomas.80
With respect to the nominalists' emphasis on the
76. Peter A. Lillback, The Binding of God: Calvin 's Role in the Development of Covenant
Theology 46-48 (Baker Academic 2001) [hereinafter Lillback, Binding of God]. See also
Oberman, Medieval Harvest,supra n. 57, at 245-246:
[For nominalists] God is committed to give his grace to all who do what is in them. This
does not detract from his sovereignty, since in eternity God was free to establish totally
different laws; he was free to act with absolute power, the potentia absoluta,subject only
to the law of non-contradiction or the law of consistency. Out of sheer mercy and grace,
he freely decided in eternity to establish the law that he would convey grace to all who
make full use of their natural capacities. Though the law as such is freely given ....
God is now committed to it, in the order chosen by him, the order of his potentia
ordinata,and he therefore gives his grace "necessarily."
77. See e.g. David C. Steinmetz, Calvin in Context 40-50 (Oxford U. Press 1995); Anna
Case-Winters, God's Power: Traditional Understandings and Contemporary Challenges 41-46
(Westminster/J. Knox Press 1990).
78. See generally Lillback, Binding of God, supra n. 76.
79. Lillback, Binding of God, supra n. 76, at 141 ("[T]he covenant for Calvin implies the
self-binding of God through His Word of promise whereby He has chosen or adopted a people for
Himself').
80. See Schreiner, Theater of His Glory, supra n. 26, at 34:
Calvin was eager, however, to define this power as reliable rather than as an ungoverned,
cruel, or tyrannical will. His rejection of the distinction between the potentia absoluta
and the potentia ordinata demonstrates this concern. Ignoring the nominalist emphasis
on God's reliable commitments to his ordained pactum, Calvin angrily rejected this
"blasphemous" separation of God's power from his justice. Such an (alleged) separation
of God's attributes, he feared, would make God into a tyrant who could de potentia
absoluta act according to a tyrannical and absolute will and could "toss men about like
balls." (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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unconstrained freedom of God, Calvin could write that:
[I]t is easier to dissever the light of the sun from its heat, or for that
matter its heat from fire, than to separate God's power from His
righteousness. Let these monstrous speculations be put far away
from pious minds, that God should be able to do more than is
proper to Him or to act without rule or reason .... For to make
God beyond law is to rob Him of the greatest part of His glory, for
it destroys His rectitude and His righteousness.81

With even more vigor, Calvin asserted that "[w]hat the Sorbonne
doctors say, that God has an absolute power, is a diabolical blasphemy
which has been invented in hell., 82 God has his reasons for everything
he does, including the promulgation of a moral order. Calvin
acknowledged that we do not always know those reasons, but he clearly
rejects voluntarism. Following Thomas, Calvin maintains that God
cannot act inordinately because he can act only in conformity with his
nature. There is a fundamental divine order on which to justify natural
law.
Calvin's rejection of intellectualism and voluntarism is significant
for his understanding of natural law. On the one hand, Calvin does not
identify natural law with human reason's participation in God's eternal
law. Natural law is not a reified semi-autonomous mediator between
God and humanity in general. On the other hand, Calvin does not
identify natural law with divine positive law; Biblical injunctions, even
the Ten Commandments, are not the only resource for knowing God's
law. Order in nature can be known naturally through the use of human
reason. While human and divine reason are not the point of contact,
they are not unrelated. The unity of God's nature insures that the natural
law is not inconsistent with the divine wisdom and the divine will.83
See also Helm, Calvin's Ideas, supra n. 49, at 312-323. But see McGrath, Life, supra n. 64, at 169
("God is not a law unto himself, nor is he above the law (ex lex); rather, his will is the foundation
of existing conceptions of morality. [Calvin, Institutes] III.xxiii.2. These terse statements
represent one of Calvin's clearest affinities with the late medieval voluntarist tradition.").
Unfortunately, McGrath leaves out the following line from the same section of the Institutes that
undercuts his attribution of voluntarism to Calvin: "And we do not advocate the fiction of
'absolute might'; because this is profane, it ought rightly to be hateful to us. We fancy no lawless
god who is a law unto himself." Calvin's rejection ofvoluntarism could hardly be more clear.
81. John Calvin, Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God 179 (J.K.S. Reid trans.,
paperback ed., J. Clarke 1982) (1552).
82. John Calvin, Sermon on Job lxxxvii (on Job 23:1-7), in Corpus Reformatorum XXXIV:
Johannis Calvini Opera quae supersunt omnia 339 (quoted in Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at
I.xvii.2 n. 7).
83. Schreiner, Theater of His Glory, supra n. 26, at 78 ("Calvin carefully maintained that in
God's superiority to natural law his power is always conjoined with his justice.") (footnote
omitted).
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So far we have seen how Calvin rejected elements of both
Thomistic and nominalistic scholastic thought. He thus discarded
Thomistic realism and ignored Thomas's Aristotelian participation
metaphysics.84 He also rejected nominalism's inordinate stress on the
will as opposed to the reason of God and, as we shall see, developed a
strong doctrine of common grace to ground epistemic certainty.8 5
Calvin's emphasis on the extent of the depravity of the human intellect
distanced him from the prevailing nominalistic tradition. For Calvin,
there was only one mediator between God and man-the Lord Jesus
Christ-not only in the economy of salvation but also in the order of
providence.86
Calvin's understanding of natural law is embedded in a complex
and interrelated matrix of theological concepts; it does not stand alone.
We will therefore take an abbreviated look at Calvin's positions on
human nature, the nature of human understanding and his doctrine of
providence before proceeding to common grace, and finally, natural law.
B.

Calvin's Ontology and Epistemology

Calvin has much to say about "nature." And what he says of nature
can be divided between two uses that must carefully be distinguished.
"Nature" can refer either to the fallen condition of the world or the
created cosmos as such, irrespective of its moral state:

84. See John Calvin, Commentary on the Gospel According to John 21 (Ages Software 1998)
(1553) where Calvin writes with respect to Augustine's realistic epistemology:
Augustine, who is excessively addicted to the philosophy of Plato, is carried along,
according to custom, to the doctrine of ideas; that before God made the world, he had the
form of the whole building conceived in his mind; and so the life of those things which
did not yet exist was in Christ, because the creation of the world was appointed in him.
But how widely different this is from the intention of the Evangelist we shall
immediately see.
85. Here too we see that Calvin was closer to Thomas, who freely acknowledged the serious
impact of sin on human reasoning (see Aquinas, S. T, supra n. 56, at Iia.85.3) than to Thomas's
nominalistic successors (see Oberman, Medieval Harvest, supra n. 57, at 128-13 1). As Paul Helm
puts it:
[O]ne cannot fail to be struck by a number of evident similarities and equally evident
dissimilarities between [Aquinas'] position and Calvin's ....
We must make a broad and
rough distinction between [I] the ontological status of natural law, what natural law is,
[2] its epistemological status, how it is known, and [3] thirdly, how it is to be applied.
The relation between Aquinas and Calvin might roughly be expressed as one of
considerable agreement about the first, of some disagreement about the second, and
agreement about the third.
Helm, Calvin's Ideas, supra n. 49, at 370.
86. See Calvin, Institutes,supra n. 25, at II.xii.4 ("Of course I admit that in the original order
of creation and the unfallen state of nature Christ was set over angels and men as their Head.").
See generally Hesselink, Calvin 's Concept of Law, supra n. 267, at 69.
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Therefore we declare that man is corrupted through natural
vitiation, but a vitiation that did not flow from nature. We deny
that it has flowed from nature in order to indicate that it is an
adventitious quality which comes upon man rather than a
substantial property which has been implanted from the beginning.
Yet we call it "natural" in order that no man may think that anyone
obtains it through bad conduct, since it holds all men fast by
hereditary right.
Sin was not part of the created order but the effects of sin are now
part of the nature of things. God created nature good but by Adam's
original sin, nature, particularly human nature, has been corrupted in all
respects. 8 Nature should never be understood as possessing ontological
independence. Calvin made no use of the Thomistic notion of the
analogy of being common to God and humanity (the analogia entis).
Nature at all times, in whatever state, is dependent on God's will for its
continued existence. But it is also true that nature exists separately from
God and the human mind and, as we shall see, can be truly known by
human beings.89
Hittinger's three orders, but especially his emphasis on the primacy
of order in the divine mind for a proper understanding of natural law,
resonates with Calvin. As William Keesecker puts it,
[f]ollowing the lead of Augustine, Calvin held that one source of
law is to be found in nature, but maintained that natural law does
not derive from humans standards but from God who originally
created all things to be orderly, harmonious and good. 9°
87. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at I.i. 11.
88. Calvin comments that:
[I]t is pointless and foolish to restrict the corruption that arises thence [after the sin of
Adam] only to what are called the impulses of the senses.... From this it follows that
that part in which the excellence and nobility of the soul especially shine not only has
been wounded but so corrupted that it needs to be healed and to put on a new nature as
well.
Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at II.i.9.
Original sin, therefore, seems to be a hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature,
[T]his perversity never ceases in us, but
diffused into all parts of the soul....
Those who have said that original sin is
continually bears new fruits....
"concupiscence" have used an appropriate word, if only it be added.., that whatever is
in man from the understanding to the will, from the soul even to the flesh, has been
defiled and crammed with this concupiscence.
Id. at II.i.8.
89. See Hoitenga, Faith and Reason, supra n. 66, at 151 ("For [Calvin] the ontological status
of human nature and of the universe in which that nature has a place is confirmed by the revelation
of God in Scripture, according to which both are objective realities that God created distinct from
himself.") (emphasis in original).
90. William F. Keesecker, The Law in John Calvin's Ethics, in Calvin and Christian Ethics
19, 20 (Peter De Klerk ed., Calvin Study Socy. 1987). See also David Little, Calvin and the
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The natural created order in turn reflects the order of the divine mind:
Meanwhile let us not be ashamed to take pious delight in the
works of God open and manifest in this most beautiful theater ....
[A]lthough it is not the chief evidence for faith, yet it is the first
evidence in the order of nature, to be mindful that wherever we
cast our eyes, all things they meet are works of God, and at the
same time to ponder with pious meditation to what end God
created them. 9'
Finally, Calvin recognized that order in the human mind (implanted
by God) made possible the perception of natural law: "we observe that
there exist in all men's minds universal impressions of a certain civic
fair dealing and order .... For their seeds have, without teacher or
lawgiver, been implanted in all men."9'
Calvin's emphasis on the independence of God and the dependence
of human beings is as significant to his understanding of how humans
come to know natural law as it is for his doctrine of salvation. But
Calvin does not mention participation as the means of our awareness of
God. "Even if man had remained free from all stain, his condition
would have been too lowly for him to reach God without a Mediator." 93
Divine-human participation occurs only in the hypostatic union of God
and man in Christ. To be sure, Calvin agrees that the order of the human
mind continues, allowing human beings to know of God and about him:
"[t]here is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an
awareness of divinity [sensus divinitatis] ...God himself has implanted
in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty. 9 4 Human
awareness of God for Calvin was immediate (i.e., properly basic, in
contemporary parlance) and vital. 95 And human beings can certainly
Prospectsfor a Christian Theory of Natural Law, in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics 175
(Gene H. Outka & Paul Ramsey eds., C. Scribner's Sons 1968) [hereinafter Little, Prospects]
("Calvin's reflection on these matters begins with the theological assumption that all experience is
ordered according to a divine design."). See also Guenther H. Haas, The Concept of Equity in
Calvin's Ethics 71 (Wilfrid Laurier U. Press 1997) [hereinafter Haas, The Concept of Equity]
("For Calvin the true moral law originates from God, not nature. It is not transparently clear to
human rational ability alone").
91. Calvin, Institutes,supra n. 25, at I.xiv.20.
92. Id. at II.ii.13. See also Haas, The Concept of Equity, supra n. 90, at 76 ("Calvin the
person outside of Christ does have some knowledge of the equity of natural law.... But Calvin
insists that it is God who implants this 'natural light of righteousness' in the human heart."
(emphasis in original).
93. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at II.xii.l.
94. Id. at I.iii. I.
95. As Calvin notes:
Men of sound judgment will always be sure that a sense of divinity which can never be
effaced is engraved upon men's minds.... [lit is not a doctrine that must first be learned
in school, but one of which each of us is master from mother's womb and which nature
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have knowledge notwithstanding the effect of sin on human nature.96
Calvin explicitly taught that faculties like reason and the will remain
intact in fallen humanity. 97 People still evaluate and judge according to
a rational standard, however clouded that standard may be. And for
Calvin human beings still act on their rational judgments and volitional
desires. Yet reason and will are, in Calvin's phrase, corrupted by sin. 98
Citing Augustine, Calvin expressly adopts "the common opinion.., that
the natural gifts were corrupted in man through sin, but that his
supernatural gifts were stripped from him." 99
God's continuing maintenance of the order of nature is also
fundamental for Calvin: "[God] sustains, nourishes, and cares for,
everything he has made, even to the least sparrow."' 0 0 A strong form of
God's providential care extends even to the detailed governance of
human affairs.' 0 ' The divine will, together with providence and the
immediate knowledge of God (the sensus divinitatis), provides the
foundations for the orders of natural law. It is the immediate knowledge
of God that forms the basis for the exercise of the faculty of judgment,
in other words, the capacity by which humanity knows that there is a
right and wrong. In turn, the categories of implanted law (largely the
Decalogue) and the mediated knowledge of God from experience inform
the conscience, that faculty which fills the concepts of right and wrong
with content.10 2 Or, to use Hittinger's terminology, the sensus divinitatis
and providence combine to reveal the divine order. Yet the significant
impact of sin clouds the issue.'0 3 In the comments that follow we will
itself permits no one to forget, although many strive with every nerve to this end.
Id. at I.iii.3. Compare Calvin with nominalist Gabriel Biel who, according to Heiko Oberman,
held that "knowledge [about God] is originally acquired by experience or abstraction... and is
not per se nota." Oberman, Medieval Harvest,supra n. 57, at 40 (emphasis in original).
96. See Carl F.H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority vol. 2, 136 (Word Books 1976)
("However serious its consequences and however far-reaching its effects, the fall of man ... did
not involve man's total loss of knowledge of God, nor of his rational competence or ethical
accountability.").
97. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at lI.ii. 12 ("Since reason.., by which man distinguishes
between good and evil, and by which he understands and judges, is a natural gift, it could not be
completely wiped out.... Similarly the will, because it is inseparable from man's nature, did not
perish ...").
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. atI.xvi.1.
101. Id. at I.xvi.4-6.
102. Id. at II.viii. I ("Now that inward law, which we have above described as written, even
engraved, upon the hearts of all, in a sense asserts the very same things that are to be learned from
the two Tables.").
103. See Helm, Calvin'sIdeas, supra n. 49, at 373:
The contrast with Calvin at this point is fairly sharp. For Aquinas the revelation of the
Decalogue complements the natural law which is recognizable by all. For Calvin,
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C.

Calvin's Doctrines of Providence and Common Grace

Calvin's understanding of creation and the fall were traditional.
God created everything good but the fall affected all of creation. With
respect to the doctrine of providence, Calvin asserted that God is not
only the creator of everything that is, "he is also everlasting Governor
and Preserver-not only in that he drives the celestial frame ... but also

in that he sustains, nourishes, and cares for, everything he has
made ....,,104
Commenting on Psalm 104, Calvin writes that,
we are taught that the winds do not blow by chance, nor the
lightnings flash by a fortuitous impulse, but that God, in the
exercise of his sovereign power, rules and05 controls all the
agitations and disturbances of the atmosphere. 1
06
Providence is the means by which God continues to govern all events.1
Yet, the creation was seriously impaired by the fall: "Nor is it any

wonder that... by his rebellion.., he [Adam] perverted the whole
order of nature in heaven and on earth."'0 7 But by God's continued
providence nature has remained sufficiently orderly to allow for the
flourishing of human society. Calvin admitted that "sometimes the
causes of the events are hidden."' ' Thus, the human ability to correctly

interpret the meaning of natural events and human history is severely
limited and humility is the appropriate virtue.

Given the conflicting

though those without benefit of special revelation know that there is a natural law and
have some sense of its content, nevertheless what that moral law is can as a result of the
Fall only be known clearly through a reasoned understanding of special revelation....
For Thomas, the Decalogue expresses particular instances of the natural law, which we
know as well as or even better than the Decalogue. Calvin recognizes the fact of natural
law, and the limited though essential role that it plays, but the Decalogue has a more
From its particularities more general
fundamental epistemological position.
principles... may be derived. Nevertheless, even for Calvin the natural law functioning
in those bereft of special revelation has a positive effect.
104. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at I.xvi.l.
105. John Calvin, Commentary Upon the Book of Psalms 146 (Ages Software 1998) (1563).
106. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at I.xvi.4 ("[P]rovidence means... that by which, as
keeper of the keys, he governs all events."). Calvin does not posit a passive attitude toward
creation; rather, as Paul Helm describes it: "Creation, for Calvin, is of different kinds of things, for
God 'endowed each kind with its own nature, assigned functions, [and] appointed places and
stations,' kinds of things that have different and distinctive sets of powers, such as the power to
propagate." Helm, Calvin 's Ideas, supra n. 49, at 99 (footnote omitted).
107. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at I.i.5.
108. Id. at I.xvii.l.
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signals of nature, Calvin, quoting Augustine, concluded that, "[b]ecause
we do not know all the things which God in the best possible order does
concerning us, we act solely in good will according to the law ...."109
Even before addressing the question of the effect of the fall on order in
the human mind, we see Calvin's emphasis on the need for God's
revealed law due to human limitations when one is confronted by an
order in nature affected by sin.
The fall affected not only the natural order but all of human nature.
Humanity's natural gifts, including reason, were seriously impaired:
"soundness of mind and uprightness of heart were withdrawn at the
same time. This is the corruption of the natural gifts." '" 0 Note that
Calvin implicitly acknowledges that even sinful human nature retains
the mind and the will; the faculties of our created human nature remain.
Had it been otherwise, "our fall would have entailed the destruction of
our whole human nature.""'
People are not reduced to less than
animals." 2 God could have removed even the natural gifts from
humanity after the fall but out of his gracious good will he did not. This
aspect of God's grace is not salvific but it is common to the whole of
humanity.
While neither Budziszewski nor Hittinger address the
doctrine of common grace, later writers in the Reformed tradition have
thus described God's
preservation of humanity and prolongation of time
3
as common grace. 1
But what is Calvin's evaluation of the extent of the corruption of
the natural gifts? Is reason after the fall simply a capacity that
invariably goes awry? "[E]ven though something of understanding and
judgment remains... we shall not call a mind whole and sound that is
both weak and plunged into deep darkness," he wrote." 14 Sin renders the
mind incomplete and unsound. While we see that for Calvin reason is
not completely incapacitated, this only pushes the question back another
step: Of what value is a mind in such a state? Can we trust many, some,
or none of the deliverances of reason? And if we can trust only some of
what reason discloses, what should be our degree of confidence in those
109. Id. at I.xvii.2.
110. Id. at II.ii.12.
111. Id. at ll.ii.17.
112. Id. ("To sum it up: We see among all mankind that reason is proper to our nature; it
distinguishes us from brute beasts ....
").
113. Id. at ll.ii.16, supra n. 25 ("[W]e ought not to forget those most excellent benefits of the
divine Spirit, which he distributes to whomever he will, for the common good of mankind."). See
also Hesselink, Calvin's Concept of Law, supra n. 267, at 70-71 ("Calvin's high evaluation of
natural law and his acknowledgement of natural human achievement in several significant areas is
not based on humanity's inherent goodness or worth but on God's grace.").
114. Calvin, Institutes,supra n. 25, at II.ii.12.
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conclusions?
Even impacted by sin, the human mind can discover some truth.' 15
Calvin writes, however, that the truth-identifying function of human
reason varies significantly with the objects of consideration.
[T]here is one kind of understanding of earthly things; another of
heavenly. I call "earthly things" those which do not pertain to God
or his Kingdom, to true justice, or to the blessedness of the future
life; but which have their significance and relationship with regard
to the present life and are, in a sense, confined within its bounds. I
call "heavenly things" the pure knowledge of God, the nature of
true righteousness, and the mysteries of the Heavenly Kingdom."16
Calvin here comes close to the well known Thomistic aphorism
about grace building upon nature. The common order of human
nature' and the order of world around us"' so constrains human reason
that reason "can't help" but discover the truth about many states of
affairs. Topics such as the liberal arts and the sciences fall into this
category of "can't helps.""' 9 Yet, even in the world of the mundane the
effects of sin are significant. And more importantly, those whose reason
has not been illuminated by faith have no foundation for their
In the current parlance of epistemology, they lack
conclusions.
justification. As Calvin puts it:
But lest anyone think a man truly blessed when he is credited with
possessing great power to comprehend truth under the elements of
this world, we should at once add that all this capacity to
understand.., is an unstable and transitory thing in20 God's sight
when a solid foundation of truth does not underlie it.'
Thus, even when the world of nature is under consideration, the
noetic effects of sin are significant. Unregenerate human reason is
ultimately subject to futility. However, reason's futility for Calvin does
not primarily consist in erroneous judgments (although that is certainly a
symptom); rather, reason's futility is revealed in its impiety. Although
the penultimate effects of sin do not utterly incapacitate reason's
115. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at II.ii.12 ("When we so condemn human understanding
for its perpetual blindness as to leave it no perception of any object whatever, we not only go
against God's Word, but also run counter to the experience of common sense.").
116. /d. atlIIii. 13.
117. John Calvin, Commentary on the Book of Genesis 135 (Ages Software 1998) (1554)
("[M]an is a social animal, and all naturally desire mutual intercourse .... ").
118. See Cochrane, Church-StateRelations, supra n. 267, at 189 ("Calvin finds the origin and
basis of all offices involving superiority and subordination not in the Fall, but in the order of
nature.").
119. Calvin, Institutes,supra n. 25, at II.ii.14-15.
120. Id. at ll.ii.16.
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effectiveness among the ungodly, their correct judgments are not "good"
because they are not ordered to the worship and praise of God.12' The
will corrupted by sin invariably
diverts reason's power of judgment from
22
its divinely appointed end.1
Sin's effects become more pronounced when the object of analysis
moves from the terrestrial to the heavenly. With respect to matters
related to the worship of God, Calvin writes that "if we want to measure
our reason by God's law, the pattern of perfect righteousness, we shall
find in how many respects it is blind! Surely it does not at all comply
with the principal points of the First Table ....
Yet it is clear that
for Calvin, the natural law and civil government in general fall within
the class of earthly things, things with respect to which the penultimate
deliverances of even unregenerate reason can frequently be correct.
D.

Calvin and Natural Law

Having identified foundations for discovering the law of God with
respect to civil society from nature and reason, it remains to be seen how
Calvin deploys the concept of natural law. Of the sources of natural law
Calvin writes:
[S]ince man is by nature a social animal, he tends through natural
instinct to foster and preserve society. Consequently, we observe
that there exist in all men's minds universal impressions of a
certain civic fair dealing and order. Hence no man is to be found
who does not understand that every sort of human organization
must be regulated by laws, and who does not comprehend the
principles of those laws. Hence arises that unvarying consent of
all nations and of individual mortals with regard to laws. For their
seeds 24have, without teacher or lawgiver, been implanted in all
men. 1

Two things should be noted about Calvin's view of the foundation
of natural law from the outset. First, it exists "naturally." There is no
121. Calvin writes:
[W]e [ought] to repudiate the opinion of those who suppose that there is deliberate
malice and depravity in all sins. For we know all too well by experience how often we
fall despite our good intention....
[O]ur diligence, insight, understanding, and
carefulness [is] so completely corrupted that we can devise or prepare nothing right in
God's eyes [.]... [T]o the Holy Spirit who "'knows that all the thoughts of the wise are
futile" and who clearly declares that "every imagination of the human heart is solely
evil" it seems most fitting.
Id. at Il.ii.25.
122. Id. at II.ii.24.
123. Id.

124. Id. at II.ii.13.
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need to reason from the contingent fact of human sociability to the
substance of the natural law. Although Calvin states the obvious-that
man is a social animal-he disagrees with later natural law writers like

Samuel Pufendorf who ground the natural law solely in "order in
nature."1 25 For Calvin, man does not create natural law because he is
sociable; rather, man is sociable because God has implanted the law in
his heart.
Second, like the sensus divinitatis, natural law is not so much an
order in the human mind but it is part and parcel of even fallen human
nature. 126 The natural law is, of course, articulated through the faculty of
reason but not because human reason participates in the divine. Instead,

Calvin places the natural law in the human heart. Calvin's doctrine of
the heart is difficult to identify with precision, but he closely identifies
the heart and the will.

27

Calvin identifies the directional center of

human existence with the will with rather than the mind's participation
in divine reason. We can therefore expect that Calvin's articulation of
the natural law can be configured consistently with Hittinger's three
129
orders 128 but its application limited to Budziszewski's apologetic use.
Calvin's comments about the ancient writers who discussed the
natural law disclose his doctrine of common grace and his placement of
the seeds of the natural law in the pre-theoretical human heart. On the

one hand, he writes that "[i]n every age there have been persons who,
guided by nature, have striven toward virtue .... [T]hey have by the
very zeal of their honesty given proof that there was some purity in their
125. See Samuel Pufendorf, Dejure naturae etgentium libri octo 205 (C.H. & W.A. Oldfather
trans., The Clarendon Press 1934) (1688) ("There seems to us no more fitting and direct way to
learn the law of nature than through careful consideration of the nature, condition, and desires of
man himself.").
126. See John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans 96-97
(Ages Software 1998) (1540) (Since then all nations, of themselves and without a monitor, are
disposed to make laws for themselves, it is beyond all question evident that they have some
notions ofjustice and rectitude... and which are implanted by nature in the hearts of men.").
127. As Calvin explains:
[l]t behooves us to consider the sort of remedy by which divine grace corrects and cures
the corruption of nature.... When the apostle tells the Philippians he is confident "that
he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ"
[Phil 1:6], there is no doubt that through "the beginning of a good work" he denotes the
very origin of conversion itself, which is in the will. God begins his good work in us,
therefore, by arousing love and desire and zeal for righteousness in our hearts; or, to
speak more correctly, by bending, forming, and directing, our hearts to righteousness.
Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at II.iii.6. But see Calvin, Commentary on Romans, supra n. 126,
at 96-97 where he asserts that the word "heart" as used in Romans 2:15 is not to be identified with
"the seat of affections, but only for the understanding ...
128. See Hittinger, The First Grace,supra n. 7.
129. See Budziszewski, Written on the Heart,supra n. 4, at 184-186.
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nature."' 3 O On the other hand, "these are not common gifts of nature, but
special graces of God, which he bestows variously and in a certain
measure upon men otherwise wicked."'' Calvin could speak highly of
the ancient jurists:
[s]hall we deny that the truth shone upon the ancient jurists who
established civic order and discipline with such great equity?...
[W]e cannot read the writings of the ancients on these subjects...
32
without recognizing at the same time that it comes from God.'
But he also noted that "even here one sometimes detects a failure to
endure... [because] the natural man refuses to be led to recognize the
diseases of his lusts.' 33 And, notwithstanding the great insights of the
ancient pagans into natural law, they inevitably failed to pursue these
truths in a way that honored God with true worship. The greatest
observations of the ancients about civic life were inextricably mingled
forms of idolatry and frequently with grossest immorality as
with gross
4
well.

13

In the content of the natural law, Calvin basically follows the
medieval tradition-the Ten Commandments. 135 The purpose of the
inscripturation of the natural law by God at Mt. Sinai according to
Calvin was also commonplace-to provide a clearer witness of what sin
had obscured. 36 Calvin intentionally did not pursue the outworking of
natural law at great length.'3 7 That Calvin did not perceive the necessity
130. Calvin, Institutes,supra n. 25, at II.iii.3.
131. Id. at II.iii.4. Note that Calvin does not identify natural law as a prelapsarian (pre-fall)
"grace" but simply as part of the creation order. But see supra n. 37 (Hittinger describing natural
law as the "first gracc").
132. Calvin, Institutes,supra n. 25, at I.ii.15.
133. Id. at II.ii.24.
134. Calvin's doctrine of the "two kingdoms" explains his positive view of the natural law for
ongoing civic (but not ecclesiastical) affairs. See Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at IIl.xix. 15. See
generally VanDrunen, Context of Natural Law, supra n. 63.
135. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at II.viii. I ("Now that inward law, which we have above
described as written, even engraved, upon the heart, in a sense asserts the very same things that
are to be learned from the two Tables." (emphasis added)). Calvin was apparently unwilling to
assume a one-to-one relationship between the natural law and the Ten Commandments but did not
spell out where they differed. See also Haas, The Concept of Equity, supra n. 90, at 65 ("Natural
law reveals His will, but because sin has affected our ability to perceive it, God gives clear witness
to His will in the written law of scripture." (footnote omitted)).
136. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at II.viii.1 ("But man is so shrouded in the darkness of
errors that he hardly begins to grasp through this natural law what worship is acceptable to
God.... Accordingly.... the Lord has provided us with a written law to give us a clearer witness
.
of what was too obscure in the natural law ..
137. Calvin writes only that:
But because I have undertaken to say with what laws a Christian state ought to be
governed, this is no reason why anyone should expect a long discourse concerning the
best kind of laws. This would be endless and would not pertain to the present purpose
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of detailed analysis of the application of natural law is consistent with
his robust doctrine of common grace. The development of positive law
to the middle of the sixteenth century as informed by natural law was
satisfactory. 3 8 One can only wonder whether the contemporary state of
positive law, uninformed by any objective version of higher law, would
have prompted Calvin to pursue the topic further.
Calvin's strong doctrine of sin suggests that he would not find
appeals to natural law with the unconverted as useful as Thomas seems
to suggest. Nature suffers the disordering effects of sin and, while
reason remains common to all people, it is corrupted. Thus, in the
postlapsarian age, the results of even correct judgments are vitiated by a
corrupt will. 3 9 And even where the corrupt will acts on a correct

judgment in a single matter its concupiscence overflows in many other
situations. Natural law functions for Calvin as a tacit platform for
common action in a civic polity but functions explicitly as a tool by
which God restrains a descent into bestiality-God's bridle, as it were.
Others [the unregenerate] he merely restrains by throwing a bridle
over them only that they may not break loose ....
Hence some
and place. I shall in but a few words, and as in passing, note what laws can piously be
used before God, and be rightly administered among men.
Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at IV.xx.14. Given his legal training, Calvin was certainly wellacquainted with natural law. See McGrath, Life, supra n. 64, at 58-62; John T. McNeill, Calvin on
Civil Government, 42 J. Presbyerian Hist. 71 (1964) ("John Calvin [was] the son of a law clerk, a
graduate in law, a classicist familiar with the political treatises of Plato and Aristotle, Cicero and
Seneca .... ); see generally Haas, The Concept ofEquity, supra n. 90, at 7-8 (discussing Calvin's
legal studies at Orleans). Like Hittinger and Budziszewski, Calvin believed that natural law
provided the contours for the laws of a civil polity, not the details. See generally John Witte, Jr. &
Robert M. Kingdon, Sex, Marriage,and Family in John Calvin's Geneva (W.B. Eerdmans Pub.
Co. 2005) [hereinafter Witte & Kingdon, Sex, Marriage, and Family] (describing in detail
Calvin's influence on Geneva's (and Europe's) development of family law through Genevan
legislation, consistory (church court) cases, commentaries, and correspondence).
138. McNeill, Calvin on Civil Government, supra n. 137, at 82 ("In areas where Christ's
kingship is not thought of by ruler or people [Calvin] sees the civic order as a valid organ of the
divine purpose functioning through natural law.") See also Witte & Kingdon, Sex, Marriage,and
Family, supra n. 137; Harro Hopfl, The ChristianPolity of John Calvin 150 (Cambridge U. Press
1982) [hereinafter Hopfl, ChristianPolity]:
[P]art of the reason for this [failure to assemble his moral and political ideas into a single
treatise] is ... that Calvin regarded what he had to say on moral matters (and to that
extent on political and legal ones) as obvious to all godly men, and in many cases to
ungodly and even pagan ones as well.... His "office" as a theologian and a minister
was to remind men of what they knew already and to urge them on to better
performance ....
139. As Haas puts it,
Calvin's doctrine of ordo naturae is "less a description of nature as it is and more a
description of nature as it was originally meant to be." . . . 'The perfect ordo naturae in
human history ... has continuing significance rather as precept, or law of God, rather
than as a description of an existing order.
Haas, The Concept of Equity, supra n. 90, at 70 (footnote omitted).
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are restrained by shame ... others by the fear of the law .... Still
others, because they consider an honest manner of life
profitable .... Others rise above the common lot, in order by their
excellence to keep the rest obedient to them. Thus God by his
providence bridles perversity of nature, that40it may not break forth
into action; but he does not purge it within.
Note that the bridling effect of natural law is not primarily to be
found in its existence as such. Even where corrupted reason exercises
correct judgment, the corrupt will may follow that judgment for a
number of reasons. None of those reasons, however, is to pay homage
to God "because, however excellent anyone has been, his own ambition
always pushes him on-a blemish with which all virtues are so sullied
Unregenerate humanity's
that before God they lose all favor .... ,
decision to follow the natural law is due to human nature as preserved
by God. Implementation of the broad dictates of the natural law is due
self-preservation, an instinct left by
in large part to the human instinct 1of
42
character.
gracious
his
to
due
God
BACK TO THE FUTURE: CALVIN'S TEACHINGS ON NATURAL LAW IN A
POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD

Calvin's realism about the limits of natural law outside a Christian
commonwealth finds ample support in the lament in Hittinger's
Introduction: "[p]remises or conclusions even remotely theological

140. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at II.iii.3. See also John Calvin, Commentary on the First
Epistle to Timothy 2:3 (Ages Software 1998) (1556). As Haas puts it,
Calvin considers the demands of natural law to be the same as those of the Second Table,
and he believes these to be the expressions of the principle of equity, the implementation
of the rule of love of neighbour .... "The second [table requires that] we render to our
neighbors what belongs to them and observe the natural law.., of not doing anything to
anyone unless we would want them to do the same to us." For Calvin, it is equity, at
least in its outward social expression and the rule of love of neighbour, that are the
essential features of the natural law that God implants ....
Haas, The Concept of Equity, supra n. 90, at 68 (footnote omitted).
141. Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at II.iii.4.
142. According to Calvin:
[I]f we hold the view that men have, part from grace, some impulses (however puny)
toward good, what shall we reply to the apostle who even denies that we are capable of
conceiving anything [2 Co 3:5]? ... Rather let us value Christ's saying: "Every one who
commits sin is a slave to sin" [John 8:34]. We are all sinners by nature; therefore we are
held under the yoke of sin. But if the whole man lies under the power of sin, surely it is
necessary that the will ... be restrained by the stoutest bonds ....
Id. at II.ii.27. I thus find myself out of accord with Hopfl's assertion that Calvin had no
meaningful place for natural law. See Hopfl, Christian Polity, supra n. 138, at 179-182. For a
critical analysis of Hopfl's position, see Helm, Calvin's Ideas, supra n. 49, at 363-364; see
generally Haas, The Concept of Equity, supra n. 90.
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(natural or revealed) are unacceptable for public purposes."' 143 And in
Budziszewski's characterization as "pearl casting" the ineffectual fruit
of those who would simply toss bons mots of sacred texts into the public
square. 144 When the nature (and even existence) of "prior premises" is a
contentious issue, debaters in the contemporary public square are
expected to avoid appeals to premises that refer to controversial
concepts. The centrality of the heart (or will) to Calvin's anthropology
makes clear the reason for this state of affairs. Until the heart is
regenerated and reoriented by God's redeeming grace, Calvin would
have expected little more from a neo-pagan world. Consistent with
Budziszewski's apologetic use of natural law, Calvin would have
understood that appeals to the constraints of shame, fear, and desire for
profit will have to do in the earthly kingdom.
While in Calvin's view God's common grace will continue bridling
the worst of human corruption, we should not presume that God will do
more than the minimum in the post-Christian West.
Given
postmodernism's rejection of order in nature (following modernity's
rejection of order in the divine mind), we can expect even less restraint
in the face of increasing demands for subjective individual autonomy.
The confusion of contemporary thinking about the natural law engenders
more pessimism. 45 At this point Calvin and those like Hittinger and
Budziszewski are one. Natural rights, understood as a zone of autonomy
to be protected by legal immunities, simply do not exist. All of life is
coram deo, before the face of God, and lawful order is a fundamental
aspect of human nature.
CONCLUSION

The cosmos and the human heart reflect the original divine order
regardless of their suppression by a large mass of humanity. Hittinger's
three orders provide a useful framework for understanding what the
natural law is. Yet, Budziszewski is also correct to question how
explicit appeals to the truth of order in the divine mind will be effective
143. Hittinger, The First Grace, supra n. 7, at xvii-xviii.
144. J. Budziszewski, What We Can't Not Know 202-203 (Spence Publg. Co. 2003).
145. As Hittinger puts it:
[W]e find functional appeals to a higher law that turns out to be no higher law at all ....
[P]olitical institutions are required to recognize and protect the immunity of individuals
from any known source of obligation and authority. In the name of authority-the
authority of some "higher law"-the individual comes to occupy an authority-free zone
in the very midst of civil society.
Hittinger, The First Grace, supra n. 7, at xv (emphasis in original). See generally Pauline C.
Westerman, The Disintegrationof NaturalLaw Theory: Aquinas to Finis (Brill 1998).
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in a world which suppresses them. We can expect a direct correlation
between the bridling effect of natural law and a society's openness to
instruction from the law written on its hearts and God's providence.
Calvin would not be surprised by the lawlessness of a society which
denies God and consciously rejects meaning in history. While Calvin
was no biblicist in his understanding of the divine law, 46 he would
certainly not rule out direct appeals to Scripture in grounding positive
law. Nonetheless, Protestants should not be afraid of using natural law
to critique positive law and propose new laws. 147 Whether explicit
attributions are made to its foundation in the divine order is a matter of
prudence. References to "higher law" may work for the time being.'48
In any event, as Calvin would have it, faith in God's promise of
common grace and hope in his ultimate eschatological re-ordering will
have to be enough in a world which has turned its back on the one and
rejects the other.

146. Calvin tersely comments that:
I would have preferred to pass over this matter in utter silence if I were not aware that
here many dangerously go astray. For there are some who deny that a commonwealth is
duly framed which neglects the political system of Moses and is ruled by the common
law of nations. Let other men consider how perilous and seditious this notion is; it will
be enough for me to have proved it false and foolish.
Calvin, Institutes, supra n. 25, at IV.xx. 14.
147. As McQuade and Bowser put it:
We have here [in natural law] a fine product. It was designed in ancient times and has
proved itself capable of being adapted to meet the needs of every age, both legal and
societal. It provides, as it has always provided, a basis for living together in harmony
and moving forward to better arrangements of our affairs.
McQuade & Bowser, Marketing NaturalLaw, supra n. 1, at 215.
148. Hittinger, The FirstGrace, supran. 7, at 36.

